An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. An offer of work from a headhunter, most likely a young woman, operating from China. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 on the side writing a small number of political reports for a Chinese company peppered with “non-public” or “insider” information. Compensation in digital currency or physical money favored.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency still considers it valuable to deploy recruitment consultants to attempt this – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Social Media
In 2023, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding 30-month period, seeking governmental, commercial, military and scientific secrets. However a new initiative aimed at politicians and Westminster has led the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legal Changes
In the typical manner of British intelligence, there was no official release of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the service was aware its briefing note would leak once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the media assists the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the impact of flushing out additional details from in and around Westminster, although that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The agency wants public figures to understand that simply because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
The two had been charged of working for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the since replaced previous legislation resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Long-Term Goals
Legislation has since been updated, and the MI5 slide includes a reminder of its replacement: “Individuals involved in spying operations risk significant legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a criminal offense if a person engages in conduct that is or is likely to “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious inquiry, though, is what China has to achieve. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited access of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But Beijing is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are distinct approaches too. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering techniques and the scale of its spy network is enormous, employing 300,000 people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to cultivate people over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a low threshold for which details is deemed to be of value,” security minister a government official told MPs on this week, but a rapid shift in the government situation may result in someone quickly peripheral turning important.
An alternative perspective to think about the continuous activities at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the west at a level below the level of outright war. China has stepped up its cyber operations, with the one campaign penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the another operation compromise of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in persistent efforts to identify covert sources on UK politics online because it wants to be provocative, to display power and because it can.
